Competition in Telecommunications电信竞争

分类: 图书,进口原版书,经管与理财 Business & Investing ,
作者: Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole著
出 版 社:
出版时间: 2001-4-1字数:版次: 1页数: 315印刷时间: 2001/04/01开本: 16开印次: 1纸张: 胶版纸I S B N : 9780262621502包装: 平装编辑推荐
作者简介:Jean-Jacques Laffont is Professor of Economics at the Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and the Institut Universitaire de France and Director of the Institut d'Economie Industrielle.
内容简介
In Competition in Telecommunications, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole analyze regulatory reform and the emergence of competition in network industries using the state-of-the-art theoretical tools of industrial organization, political economy, and the economics of incentives.
The book opens with background information for the reader who is unfamiliar with current issues in the telecommunication industry. The following sections focus on four central aspects of the recent deregulatory movement: the introduction of incentive regulation; one-way access; the special nature of competition in a industry requiring two-way access; and universal service, in particular, the use of engineering models to compute subsidies and the design of universal service auctions.
目录
Series Foreword
Laudation for Jean Tirole
Preface
Acknowledgments
1 Setting the Stage
1.1 Introduction
1.2 A Brief Guided Tour through the Telecommunications Industry
1.3 Regulatory Reforms
2 Incentive Regulation
2.1 Economic Principles: Performance-Based Regulation
2.2 Economic Principles: Pricing Services to the Consumer
2.3 Practical Aspects
3 Essential Facility and One-Way Access: Theory
3.1 Background
3.2 Economic Principles
3.3 Refining the Theory: Lack of Instruments and Multiple Goals for Interconnection Charges
3.4 Two Specific Concerns and Some Common Misperceptions about Ramsey Access Pricing
4 Essential Facility and One-Way Access: Policy
4.1 General Issues for the Design of Access Policies
4.2 Backward-Looking Cost-Based Pricing of Access
4.3 Regulated and Deregulated Segments: The Problem of Cross-Subsidies
4.4 Forward-Looking Cost-Based Pricing of Access
4.5 Cost-Based Access Pricing and Exclusion
4.6 ECPR and Its Applications
4.7 Global Price Cap
4.8 Global Price Cap and Incentives to Exclude
5Multiple Bottlenecks and Two-Way Access with Patrick Rey
5.1 Background
5.2 Ineffectiveness of Noncooperative Access Price Setting
5.3 Do Wholesale Agreements Promote Retail Collusion? T Patent Pool Analogy
5.4 Application to Two-Way Access Pricing in Telecommunications
5.5 Four Reasons Why High Access Charges May Not Facilitate Collusion
5.6 Unbundling- and Facilities-Based Entry
5.7 Alternative Policies
6Universal Service
6.1 The Need for a New Paradigm
6.2 The Foundations of Universal Service
6.3 The U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Universal Service Obligations
6.4 Universal Service Auctions
7 Concluding Remarks
7.1 Internet and Internet Telephony
7.2 Regulatory Institutions
Glossary
References
Index