Representation Reconsidered表示法的重新考虑
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作者： William M. Ramsey 著
出 版 社：
出版时间： 2007-7-1字数：版次： 1页数： 248印刷时间： 2007/07/01开本： 16开印次： 1纸张： 胶版纸I S B N ： 9780521859875包装： 精装内容简介
Cognitive representation is the single most important explanatory notion in the sciences of the mind and has served as the corner-stone for the so-called 'cognitive revolution'. This book critically examines the ways in which philosophers and cognitive scientists appeal to representations in their theories, and argues that there is considerable confusion about the nature of representational states. This has led to an excessive over-application of the notion - especially in many of the newer theories in computational neuroscience. Representation Reconsidered shows how psychological research is actually moving in a non-representational direction, revealing a radical, though largely unnoticed, shift in our basic understanding of how the mind works.
Cognitive representation is the most important explanatory notion in the sciences of the mind. Representation Reconsidered shows how psychological research is actually moving in a non-representational direction, revealing a radical, though largely unnoticed, shift in our basic understanding of how the mind works.
作者简介
William M. Ramsey is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame.
目录
List of figures
Preface
1 Demands on a representational theory
1.1 Representation as cluster concept(s)
1.2 The job description challenge
1.3 Demarcating types of representation and types of representational theories
1.4 Summary
2 Representation in classical computational theories: the Standard Interpretation and its problems
2.1 The CCTC and the Standard Interpretation
2.2 Difficulties with the Standard Interpretation
2.3 Summary
3 Two notions of representation in the classical computational framework
3.1 IO-representarion
3.2 S-representation
3.3 Two objections and their replies
3.4 CCTC representation: further issues
3.5 Summary
4 The receptor notion and its problems
4.1 The receptor notion
4.2 The receptor notion and the job description challenge
4.3 Dretske to the rescue?
4.4 Further dimensions of the receptor notion
4.5 Does it really matter?
4.6 Summary
5 Tacit representation and its problems
5.1 The tacit notion: commonsense roots
5.2 Tacit representation in science and philosophy
5.3 A closer (and critical) look
5.4 Concluding comments
6 Where is the representational paradigm headed?
6.1 Receptor and S-representation revisited
6.2 Dynamic systems theory and the defense of representationalism
6.3 Implications of a non-representational psychology
6.4 Concluding comments
References
Index