Moral Disagreement 道德争执
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作者： Folke Tersman著
出 版 社：
出版时间： 2006-5-1字数：版次： 1页数： 141印刷时间： 2006/05/01开本： 16开印次： 1纸张： 胶版纸I S B N ： 9780521853385包装： 精装编辑推荐
作者介绍：Folke Tersman
Folke Tersman is Professor of Philosophy at Stockholm University. The author of several books, written in Swedish, on moral philosophy, he has contributed articles to Erkenntnis, Sythese, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, and Theoria.
内容简介
In this book, Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking from moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.
目录
Preface page
1Realism and Irrealism
2The Case for Radical Moral Disagreement
3Explaining and Predicting Disagreement
4The Argument from Inaccessibility
5The Argument from Ambiguity
6Attributing Moral Judgments
References
Index
