互连网与网络经济学 / 国际会议录/Internet and network economics
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作者： Paul SPiralkis 等著
出 版 社： 广东教育出版社
出版时间： 2006-12-1字数：版次： 1页数： 400印刷时间： 2006/12/01开本：印次：纸张： 胶版纸I S B N ： 9783540681380包装： 平装编辑推荐
The LNCS series reports state-of-the-art results in computer science research,development,and education,at a high level and in both printed and electronic form.Enjoying tight cooperation with the R&D community,with numerous individuals,as well as with prestigious organizations and societies,LNCS has grown into the most comprehensive computer science resarch forum available.
The scope of LNCS,including its subseries LNAI,spans the whole range of computer science and information technology including interdisciplinary topics in a variety of application fields.The type of material publised traditionally includes.
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内容简介
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the First International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2006, held in Hong Kong, China in December 2005. The 108 revised full papers presented together with 2 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 372 submissions. There are 31 papers in the main program and 77 papers presented in 16 special tracks covering the areas of internet and algorithmic economics, e-commerce protocols, security, collaboration, reputation and social networks, algorithmic mechanism, financial computing, auction algorithms, online algorithms, collective rationality, pricing policies, web mining strategies, network economics, coalition strategies, internet protocols, price sequence, and equilibrium.
目录
Truthful Auctions with Optimal Profit
Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain
Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific and Weighted Congestion Games
On the Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Congestion and Local-Effect Games
Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games
The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network Congestion Games
First-Passage Percolation on a Width-2 Strip and the Path Costin a VCG Auction
Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems
Mechanisms to Induce Random Choice
Bayesian Optimal No-Deficit Mechanism Design
Succinct Approximation of Trade-Off Curves
Game-Theoretic Aspects of Designing Hyperlink Structures
Competing for Customers in a Social Network:
The Quasi-linear Case
Selfish Service Installation in Networks
Games of Connectivity
Assignment Problems in Rental Markets
On Portfolio's Default-Risk-Adjusted Duration and Value: Model and Algorithm Based on Copulas
Price Roll-Backs and Path Auctions: An Approximation Scheme for Computing the Market Equilibrium
New Results on Rationality and Strongly Polynomial Time Solvability in Eisenberg-Gale Markets
Making Economic Theory Operational
Sparse Games Are Hard
Market Equilibria with Hybrid Linear-Leontief Utilities
Polynomial Algorithms for Approximating Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games
A Note on Approximate Nash Equilibria
Ranking Sports Teams and the Inverse Equal Paths Problem
……
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